moralist does; and with the orator and
politician he considers acts according as they are deserving of
reward or punishment.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 7, Art. 3]

Whether the Circumstances Are Properly Set Forth in the Third Book of
Ethics?

Objection 1: It would seem that the circumstances are not properly
set forth in _Ethic._ iii, 1. For a circumstance of an act is
described as something outside the act. Now time and place answer to
this description. Therefore there are only two circumstances, to wit,
"when" and "where."

Obj. 2: Further, we judge from the circumstances whether a thing is
well or ill done. But this belongs to the mode of an act. Therefore
all the circumstances are included under one, which is the "mode of
acting."

Obj. 3: Further, circumstances are not part of the substance of an
act. But the causes of an act seem to belong to its substance.
Therefore no circumstance should be taken from the cause of the act
itself. Accordingly, neither "who," nor "why," nor "about what," are
circumstances: since "who" refers to the efficient cause, "why" to
the final cause, and "about what" to the material cause.

On the contrary is the authority of the Philosopher in _Ethic._ iii,
1.

_I answer that,_ Tully, in his Rhetoric (De Invent. Rhetor. i), gives
seven circumstances, which are contained in this verse:

"Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando--

"Who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, and when."

For in acts we must take note of "who" did it, "by what aids" or
"instruments" he did it, "what" he did, "where" he did it, "why" he
did it, "how" and "when" he did it. But Aristotle in _Ethic._ iii, 1
adds yet another, to wit, "about what," which Tully includes in the
circumstance "what."

The reason of this enumeration may be set down as follows. For a
circumstance is described as something outside the substance of the
act, and yet in a way touching it. Now this happens in three ways:
first, inasmuch as it touches the act itself; secondly, inasmuch as
it touches the cause of the act; thirdly, inasmuch as it touches the
effect. It touches the act itself, either by way of measure, as
"time" and "place"; or by qualifying the act as the "mode of acting."
It touches the effect when we consider "what" is done. It touches the
cause of the act, as to the final cause, by the circumstance "why";
as to the material cause, or object, in the circumstance "about
what";