nciple. Now it is clear that an
impossible conclusion does not follow from a possible principle.
Wherefore an end cannot be possible, unless the means be possible. Now
no one is moved to the impossible. Consequently no one would tend to
the end, save for the fact that the means appear to be possible.
Therefore the impossible is not the object of choice.

Reply Obj. 1: The will stands between the intellect and the external
action: for the intellect proposes to the will its object, and the
will causes the external action. Hence the principle of the movement
in the will is to be found in the intellect, which apprehends
something under the universal notion of good: but the term or
perfection of the will's act is to be observed in its relation to the
action whereby a man tends to the attainment of a thing; for the
movement of the will is from the soul to the thing. Consequently the
perfect act of the will is in respect of something that is good for
one to do. Now this cannot be something impossible. Wherefore the
complete act of the will is only in respect of what is possible and
good for him that wills. But the incomplete act of the will is in
respect of the impossible; and by some is called "velleity," because,
to wit, one would will (_vellet_) such a thing, were it possible. But
choice is an act of the will, fixed on something to be done by the
chooser. And therefore it is by no means of anything but what is
possible.

Reply Obj. 2: Since the object of the will is the apprehended good,
we must judge of the object of the will according as it is
apprehended. And so, just as sometimes the will tends to something
which is apprehended as good, and yet is not really good; so is
choice sometimes made of something apprehended as possible to the
chooser, and yet impossible to him.

Reply Obj. 3: The reason for this is that the subject should not rely
on his own judgment to decide whether a certain thing is possible;
but in each case should stand by his superior's judgment.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 13, Art. 6]

Whether Man Chooses of Necessity or Freely?

Objection 1: It would seem that man chooses of necessity. For the end
stands in relation to the object of choice, as the principle of that
which follows from the principles, as declared in _Ethic._ vii, 8. But
conclusions follow of necessity from their principles. Therefore man
is moved of necessity from (willing) the end of the choice (of the
mea