l and the righteous
are not species of good in an equal degree, but are as that which is
for its own sake and that which is for the sake of something else:
wherefore the act of the will can be directed to one and not to the
other; but not conversely.
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QUESTION 9

OF THAT WHICH MOVES THE WILL
(In Six Articles)

We must now consider what moves the will: and under this head there
are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the will is moved by the intellect?

(2) Whether it is moved by the sensitive appetite?

(3) Whether the will moves itself?

(4) Whether it is moved by an extrinsic principle?

(5) Whether it is moved by a heavenly body?

(6) Whether the will is moved by God alone as by an extrinsic
principle?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 9, Art. 1]

Whether the Will Is Moved by the Intellect?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by the
intellect. For Augustine says on Ps. 118:20: "My soul hath coveted to
long for Thy justifications: The intellect flies ahead, the desire
follows sluggishly or not at all: we know what is good, but deeds
delight us not." But it would not be so, if the will were moved by
the intellect: because movement of the movable results from motion of
the mover. Therefore the intellect does not move the will.

Obj. 2: Further, the intellect in presenting the appetible object to
the will, stands in relation to the will, as the imagination in
representing the appetible object to the sensitive appetite. But the
imagination, in presenting the appetible object, does not remove the
sensitive appetite: indeed sometimes our imagination affects us no
more than what is set before us in a picture, and moves us not at all
(De Anima ii, 3). Therefore neither does the intellect move the will.

Obj. 3: Further, the same is not mover and moved in respect of the
same thing. But the will moves the intellect; for we exercise the
intellect when we will. Therefore the intellect does not move the
will.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10) that "the
appetible object is a mover not moved, whereas the will is a mover
moved."

_I answer that,_ A thing requires to be moved by something in so far
as it is in potentiality to several things; for that which is in
potentiality needs to be reduced to act by something actual; and to
do this is to move. Now a power of the soul is seen to be in
potentiality to different things in t