not an inquiry.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.]
says: "Every counsel is an inquiry; but not every inquiry is a
counsel."

_I answer that,_ Choice, as stated above (Q. 13, A. 1, ad 2; A. 3),
follows the judgment of the reason about what is to be done. Now
there is much uncertainty in things that have to be done; because
actions are concerned with contingent singulars, which by reason of
their vicissitude, are uncertain. Now in things doubtful and
uncertain the reason does not pronounce judgment, without previous
inquiry: wherefore the reason must of necessity institute an inquiry
before deciding on the objects of choice; and this inquiry is called
counsel. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that choice is
the "desire of what has been already counselled."

Reply Obj. 1: When the acts of two powers are ordained to one
another, in each of them there is something belonging to the other
power: consequently each act can be denominated from either power.
Now it is evident that the act of the reason giving direction as to
the means, and the act of the will tending to these means according
to the reason's direction, are ordained to one another. Consequently
there is to be found something of the reason, viz. order, in that act
of the will, which is choice: and in counsel, which is an act of
reason, something of the will--both as matter (since counsel is of
what man wills to do)--and as motive (because it is from willing the
end, that man is moved to take counsel in regard to the means). And
therefore, just as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that choice
"is intellect influenced by appetite," thus pointing out that both
concur in the act of choosing; so Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii,
22) that counsel is "appetite based on inquiry," so as to show that
counsel belongs, in a way, both to the will, on whose behalf and by
whose impulsion the inquiry is made, and to the reason that executes
the inquiry.

Reply Obj. 2: The things that we say of God must be understood
without any of the defects which are to be found in us: thus in us
science is of conclusions derived by reasoning from causes to
effects: but science when said of God means sure knowledge of all
effects in the First Cause, without any reasoning process. In like
manner we ascribe counsel to God, as to the certainty of His
knowledge or judgment, which certainty in us arises from the inquiry
of counsel. But such inquiry h