Two Things at the Same Time?

Objection 1: It would seem that one cannot intend several things at
the same time. For Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 14, 16,
17) that man's intention cannot be directed at the same time to God
and to bodily benefits. Therefore, for the same reason, neither to
any other two things.

Obj. 2: Further, intention designates a movement of the will towards
a terminus. Now there cannot be several termini in the same direction
of one movement. Therefore the will cannot intend several things at
the same time.

Obj. 3: Further, intention presupposes an act of reason or of the
intellect. But "it is not possible to understand several things at
the same time," according to the Philosopher (Topic. ii, 10).
Therefore neither is it possible to intend several things at the same
time.

_On the contrary,_ Art imitates nature. Now nature intends two
purposes by means of one instrument: thus "the tongue is for the
purpose of taste and speech" (De Anima ii, 8). Therefore, for the
same reason, art or reason can at the same time direct one thing to
two ends: so that one can intend several ends at the same time.

_I answer that,_ The expression "two things" may be taken in two
ways: they may be ordained to one another or not so ordained. And if
they be ordained to one another, it is evident, from what has been
said, that a man can intend several things at the same time. For
intention is not only of the last end, as stated above (A. 2), but
also of an intermediary end. Now a man intends at the same time, both
the proximate and the last end; as the mixing of a medicine and the
giving of health.

But if we take two things that are not ordained to one another, thus
also a man can intend several things at the same time. This is
evident from the fact that a man prefers one thing to another because
it is the better of the two. Now one of the reasons for which one
thing is better than another is that it is available for more
purposes: wherefore one thing can be chosen in preference to another,
because of the greater number of purposes for which it is available:
so that evidently a man can intend several things at the same time.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine means to say that man cannot at the same time
direct his attention to God and to bodily benefits, as to two last
ends: since, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 5), one man cannot have
several last ends.

Reply Obj. 2: There can be several termini ordained to