follows from an
apprehended form. Therefore, just as the natural appetite tends to
good existing in a thing; so the animal or voluntary appetite tends
to a good which is apprehended. Consequently, in order that the will
tend to anything, it is requisite, not that this be good in very
truth, but that it be apprehended as good. Wherefore the Philosopher
says (Phys. ii, 3) that "the end is a good, or an apparent good."

Reply Obj. 1: The same power regards opposites, but it is not
referred to them in the same way. Accordingly, the will is referred
both to good and evil: but to good by desiring it: to evil, by
shunning it. Wherefore the actual desire of good is called "volition"
[*In Latin, 'voluntas'. To avoid confusion with "voluntas" (the will)
St. Thomas adds a word of explanation, which in the translation may
appear superfluous.], meaning thereby the act of the will; for it is
in this sense that we are now speaking of the will. On the other
hand, the shunning of evil is better described as "nolition":
wherefore, just as volition is of good, so nolition is of evil.

Reply Obj. 2: A rational power is not to be directed to all opposite
purposes, but to those which are contained under its proper object;
for no power seeks other than its proper object. Now, the object of
the will is good. Wherefore the will can be directed to such opposite
purposes as are contained under good, such as to be moved or to be at
rest, to speak or to be silent, and such like: for the will can be
directed to either under the aspect of good.

Reply Obj. 3: That which is not a being in nature, is considered as a
being in the reason, wherefore negations and privations are said to
be "beings of reason." In this way, too, future things, in so far as
they are apprehended, are beings. Accordingly, in so far as such like
are beings, they are apprehended under the aspect of good; and it is
thus that the will is directed to them. Wherefore the Philosopher
says (Ethic. v, 1) that "to lack evil is considered as a good."
________________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 8, Art. 2]

Whether Volition Is of the End Only, or Also of the Means?

Objection 1: It would seem that volition is not of the means, but of
the end only. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that "volition
is of the end, while choice is of the means."

Obj. 2: Further, "For objects differing in genus there are
corresponding different powers of the soul" (Ethic. vi, 1). Now, the