s of the will in reference to the end;
viz. "volition," "enjoyment," and "intention"; we must consider: (1)
volition; (2) enjoyment; (3) intention. Concerning the first, three
things must be considered:

(1) Of what things is the will?

(2) By what is the will moved?

(3) How is it moved?

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the will is of good only?

(2) Whether it is of the end only, or also of the means?

(3) If in any way it be of the means, whether it be moved to the end
and to the means, by the same movement?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 8, Art. 1]

Whether the Will Is of Good Only?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not of good only. For the
same power regards opposites; for instance, sight regards white and
black. But good and evil are opposites. Therefore the will is not only
of good, but also of evil.

Obj. 2: Further, rational powers can be directed to opposite
purposes, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, 2). But the will
is a rational power, since it is "in the reason," as is stated in _De
Anima_ iii, 9. Therefore the will can be directed to opposites; and
consequently its volition is not confined to good, but extends to
evil.

Obj. 3: Further, good and being are convertible. But volition is
directed not only to beings, but also to non-beings. For sometimes we
wish "not to walk," or "not to speak"; and again at times we wish for
future things, which are not actual beings. Therefore the will is not
of good only.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is
outside the scope of the will," and that "all things desire good."

_I answer that,_ The will is a rational appetite. Now every appetite
is only of something good. The reason of this is that the appetite is
nothing else than an inclination of a person desirous of a thing
towards that thing. Now every inclination is to something like and
suitable to the thing inclined. Since, therefore, everything,
inasmuch as it is being and substance, is a good, it must needs be
that every inclination is to something good. And hence it is that the
Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1) that "the good is that which all
desire."

But it must be noted that, since every inclination results from a
form, the natural appetite results from a form existing in the nature
of things: while the sensitive appetite, as also the intellective or
rational appetite, which we call the will,