nevertheless it directs him
in his action: since the mandate of the law is one reason for doing
something.

Reply Obj. 3: Counsel is not only about what is done, but also about
whatever has relation to what is done. And for this reason we speak
of consulting about future events, in so far as man is induced to do
or omit something, through the knowledge of future events.

Reply Obj. 4: We seek counsel about the actions of others, in so far
as they are, in some way, one with us; either by union of
affection--thus a man is solicitous about what concerns his friend,
as though it concerned himself; or after the manner of an instrument,
for the principal agent and the instrument are, in a way, one cause,
since one acts through the other; thus the master takes counsel about
what he would do through his servant.
________________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 14, Art. 4]

Whether Counsel Is About All Things That We Do?

Objection 1: It would seem that counsel is about all things that we
have to do. For choice is the "desire of what is counselled" as
stated above (A. 1). But choice is about all things that we do.
Therefore counsel is too.

Obj. 2: Further, counsel implies the reason's inquiry. But, whenever
we do not act through the impulse of passion, we act in virtue of the
reason's inquiry. Therefore there is counsel about everything that we
do.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that "if it
appears that something can be done by more means than one, we take
counsel by inquiring whereby it may be done most easily and best; but
if it can be accomplished by one means, how it can be done by this."
But whatever is done, is done by one means or by several. Therefore
counsel takes place in all things that we do.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.]
says that "counsel has no place in things that are done according to
science or art."

_I answer that,_ Counsel is a kind of inquiry, as stated above
(A. 1). But we are wont to inquire about things that admit of doubt;
hence the process of inquiry, which is called an argument, "is a
reason that attests something that admitted of doubt" [*Cicero,
_Topic._ ad Trebat.]. Now, that something in relation to human acts
admits of no doubt, arises from a twofold source. First, because
certain determinate ends are gained by certain determinate means: as
happens in the arts which are governed by certain fixed rules of
action; thus