oes the end seem to him."

Now it is evident that according to a passion of the sensitive
appetite man is changed to a certain disposition. Wherefore according
as man is affected by a passion, something seems to him fitting,
which does not seem so when he is not so affected: thus that seems
good to a man when angered, which does not seem good when he is calm.
And in this way, the sensitive appetite moves the will, on the part
of the object.

Reply Obj. 1: Nothing hinders that which is better simply and in
itself, from being less excellent in a certain respect. Accordingly
the will is simply more excellent than the sensitive appetite: but in
respect of the man in whom a passion is predominant, in so far as he
is subject to that passion, the sensitive appetite is more excellent.

Reply Obj. 2: Men's acts and choices are in reference to singulars.
Wherefore from the very fact that the sensitive appetite is a
particular power, it has great influence in disposing man so that
something seems to him such or otherwise, in particular cases.

Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2), the reason, in
which resides the will, moves, by its command, the irascible and
concupiscible powers, not, indeed, "by a despotic sovereignty," as a
slave is moved by his master, but by a "royal and politic
sovereignty," as free men are ruled by their governor, and can
nevertheless act counter to his commands. Hence both irascible and
concupiscible can move counter to the will: and accordingly nothing
hinders the will from being moved by them at times.
________________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 9, Art. 3]

Whether the Will Moves Itself?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will does not move itself. For
every mover, as such, is in act: whereas what is moved, is in
potentiality; since "movement is the act of that which is in
potentiality, as such" [*Aristotle, _Phys._ iii, 1]. Now the same is
not in potentiality and in act, in respect of the same. Therefore
nothing moves itself. Neither, therefore, can the will move itself.

Obj. 2: Further, the movable is moved on the mover being present. But
the will is always present to itself. If, therefore, it moved itself,
it would always be moving itself, which is clearly false.

Obj. 3: Further, the will is moved by the intellect, as stated above
(A. 1). If, therefore, the will move itself, it would follow that the
same thing is at once moved immediately by two movers; which seems