t man,
and the passion alone holds its sway: or if there be a movement of
the will, it does not necessarily follow the passion.
Reply Obj. 1: Although the will cannot prevent the movement of
concupiscence from arising, of which the Apostle says: "The evil
which I will not, that I do--i.e. I desire"; yet it is in the power
of the will not to will to desire or not to consent to concupiscence.
And thus it does not necessarily follow the movement of concupiscence.
Reply Obj. 2: Since there is in man a twofold nature, intellectual
and sensitive; sometimes man is such and such uniformly in respect of
his whole soul: either because the sensitive part is wholly subject
to his reason, as in the virtuous; or because reason is entirely
engrossed by passion, as in a madman. But sometimes, although reason
is clouded by passion, yet something of this reason remains free. And
in respect of this, man can either repel the passion entirely, or at
least hold himself in check so as not to be led away by the passion.
For when thus disposed, since man is variously disposed according to
the various parts of the soul, a thing appears to him otherwise
according to his reason, than it does according to a passion.
Reply Obj. 3: The will is moved not only by the universal good
apprehended by the reason, but also by good apprehended by sense.
Wherefore he can be moved to some particular good independently of a
passion of the sensitive appetite. For we will and do many things
without passion, and through choice alone; as is most evident in
those cases wherein reason resists passion.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 10, Art. 4]
Whether the Will Is Moved of Necessity by the Exterior Mover Which Is
God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is moved of necessity by
God. For every agent that cannot be resisted moves of necessity. But
God cannot be resisted, because His power is infinite; wherefore it
is written (Rom. 9:19): "Who resisteth His will?" Therefore God moves
the will of necessity.
Obj. 2: Further, the will is moved of necessity to whatever it wills
naturally, as stated above (A. 2, ad 3). But "whatever God does in a
thing is natural to it," as Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3).
Therefore the will wills of necessity everything to which God moves
it.
Obj. 3: Further, a thing is possible, if nothing impossible follows
from its being supposed. But something impossible follows from the
supposition that
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