unreasonable. Therefore the will does not move itself.
_On the contrary,_ The will is mistress of its own act, and to it
belongs to will and not to will. But this would not be so, had it not
the power to move itself to will. Therefore it moves itself.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), it belongs to the will to
move the other powers, by reason of the end which is the will's
object. Now, as stated above (Q. 8, A. 2), the end is in things
appetible, what the principle is in things intelligible. But it is
evident that the intellect, through its knowledge of the principle,
reduces itself from potentiality to act, as to its knowledge of the
conclusions; and thus it moves itself. And, in like manner, the will,
through its volition of the end, moves itself to will the means.
Reply Obj. 1: It is not in respect of the same that the will moves
itself and is moved: wherefore neither is it in act and in
potentiality in respect of the same. But forasmuch as it actually
wills the end, it reduces itself from potentiality to act, in respect
of the means, so as, in a word, to will them actually.
Reply Obj. 2: The power of the will is always actually present to
itself; but the act of the will, whereby it wills an end, is not
always in the will. But it is by this act that it moves itself.
Accordingly it does not follow that it is always moving itself.
Reply Obj. 3: The will is moved by the intellect, otherwise than by
itself. By the intellect it is moved on the part of the object:
whereas it is moved by itself, as to the exercise of its act, in
respect of the end.
________________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 9, Art. 4]
Whether the Will Is Moved by an Exterior Principle?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by anything
exterior. For the movement of the will is voluntary. But it is
essential to the voluntary act that it be from an intrinsic principle,
just as it is essential to the natural act. Therefore the movement of
the will is not from anything exterior.
Obj. 2: Further, the will cannot suffer violence, as was shown above
(Q. 6, A. 4). But the violent act is one "the principle of which is
outside the agent" [*Aristotle, _Ethic._ iii, 1]. Therefore the will
cannot be moved by anything exterior.
Obj. 3: Further, that which is sufficiently moved by one mover, needs
not to be moved by another. But the will moves itself sufficiently.
Therefore it is not moved by anything exterior.
_On th
|