ent whether the stag has passed by the first or
the second road: and if he find that the stag has not passed there,
being thus assured, takes to the third road without trying the scent;
as though he were reasoning by way of exclusion, arguing that the
stag must have passed by this way, since he did not pass by the
others, and there is no other road. Therefore it seems that
irrational animals are able to choose.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiii.]
says that "children and irrational animals act willingly but not from
choice." Therefore choice is not in irrational animals.

_I answer that,_ Since choice is the taking of one thing in preference
to another it must of necessity be in respect of several things that
can be chosen. Consequently in those things which are altogether
determinate to one there is no place for choice. Now the difference
between the sensitive appetite and the will is that, as stated above
(Q. 1, A. 2, ad 3), the sensitive appetite is determinate to one
particular thing, according to the order of nature; whereas the will,
although determinate to one thing in general, viz. the good, according
to the order of nature, is nevertheless indeterminate in respect of
particular goods. Consequently choice belongs properly to the will,
and not to the sensitive appetite which is all that irrational animals
have. Wherefore irrational animals are not competent to choose.

Reply Obj. 1: Not every desire of one thing on account of an end is
called choice: there must be a certain discrimination of one thing
from another. And this cannot be except when the appetite can be
moved to several things.

Reply Obj. 2: An irrational animal takes one thing in preference to
another, because its appetite is naturally determinate to that thing.
Wherefore as soon as an animal, whether by its sense or by its
imagination, is offered something to which its appetite is naturally
inclined, it is moved to that alone, without making any choice. Just
as fire is moved upwards and not downwards, without its making any
choice.

Reply Obj. 3: As stated in _Phys._ iii, 3 "movement is the act of the
movable, caused by a mover." Wherefore the power of the mover appears
in the movement of that which it moves. Accordingly, in all things
moved by reason, the order of reason which moves them is evident,
although the things themselves are without reason: for an arrow
through the motion of the archer goes straigh