end and the means are in different genera of good: because the end,
which is a good either of rectitude or of pleasure, is in the genus
"quality," or "action," or "passion"; whereas the good which is
useful, and is directed to and end, is in the genus "relation" (Ethic.
i, 6). Therefore, if volition is of the end, it is not of the means.

Obj. 3: Further, habits are proportionate to powers, since they are
perfections thereof. But in those habits which are called practical
arts, the end belongs to one, and the means to another art; thus the
use of a ship, which is its end, belongs to the (art of the)
helmsman; whereas the building of the ship, which is directed to the
end, belongs to the art of the shipwright. Therefore, since volition
is of the end, it is not of the means.

_On the contrary,_ In natural things, it is by the same power that a
thing passes through the middle space, and arrives at the terminus.
But the means are a kind of middle space, through which one arrives
at the end or terminus. Therefore, if volition is of the end, it is
also of the means.

_I answer that,_ The word "voluntas" sometimes designates the power
of the will, sometimes its act [*See note to A. 1, Reply Obj. 1].
Accordingly, if we speak of the will as a power, thus it extends both
to the end and to the means. For every power extends to those things
in which may be considered the aspect of the object of that power in
any way whatever: thus the sight extends to all things whatsoever
that are in any way colored. Now the aspect of good, which is the
object of the power of the will, may be found not only in the end,
but also in the means.

If, however, we speak of the will in regard to its act, then, properly
speaking, volition is of the end only. Because every act denominated
from a power, designates the simple act of that power: thus "to
understand" designates the simple act of the understanding. Now the
simple act of a power is referred to that which is in itself the
object of that power. But that which is good and willed in itself is
the end. Wherefore volition, properly speaking, is of the end itself.
On the other hand, the means are good and willed, not in themselves,
but as referred to the end. Wherefore the will is directed to them,
only in so far as it is directed to the end: so that what it wills in
them, is the end. Thus, to understand, is properly directed to things
that are known in themselves, i.e. first principles: but we do