y, when it is possessed not only in intention but also in
reality; imperfectly, when it is possessed in intention only. Perfect
enjoyment, therefore, is of the end already possessed: but imperfect
enjoyment is also of the end possessed not really, but only in
intention.
Reply Obj. 1: Augustine speaks there of perfect enjoyment.
Reply Obj. 2: The will is hindered in two ways from being at rest.
First on the part of the object; by reason of its not being the last
end, but ordained to something else: secondly on the part of the one
who desires the end, by reason of his not being yet in possession of
it. Now it is the object that specifies an act: but on the agent
depends the manner of acting, so that the act be perfect or
imperfect, as compared with the actual circumstances of the agent.
Therefore enjoyment of anything but the last end is not enjoyment
properly speaking, as falling short of the nature of enjoyment. But
enjoyment of the last end, not yet possessed, is enjoyment properly
speaking, but imperfect, on account of the imperfect way in which it
is possessed.
Reply Obj. 3: One is said to lay hold of or to have an end, not only
in reality, but also in intention, as stated above.
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QUESTION 12
OF INTENTION
(In Five Articles)
We must now consider Intention: concerning which there are five
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether intention is an act of intellect or of the will?
(2) Whether it is only of the last end?
(3) Whether one can intend two things at the same time?
(4) Whether intention of the end is the same act as volition of the
means?
(5) Whether intention is within the competency of irrational animals?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 12, Art. 1]
Whether Intention Is an Act of the Intellect or of the Will?
Objection 1: It would seem that intention is an act of the intellect,
and not of the will. For it is written (Matt. 6:22): "If thy eye be
single, thy whole body shall be lightsome": where, according to
Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 13) the eye signifies intention.
But since the eye is the organ of sight, it signifies the apprehensive
power. Therefore intention is not an act of the appetitive but of the
apprehensive power.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 13) that
Our Lord spoke of intention as a light, when He said (Matt. 6:23):
"If the light that is in thee be darkness," etc. But light pertains
to knowle
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