efore the will is moved of necessity by a passion.

Obj. 2: Further, as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 5, "according as a man is,
such does the end seem to him." But it is not in man's power to cast
aside a passion at once. Therefore it is not in man's power not to
will that to which the passion inclines him.

Obj. 3: Further, a universal cause is not applied to a particular
effect, except by means of a particular cause: wherefore the
universal reason does not move save by means of a particular
estimation, as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 11. But as the universal
reason is to the particular estimation, so is the will to the
sensitive appetite. Therefore the will is not moved to will something
particular, except through the sensitive appetite. Therefore, if the
sensitive appetite happen to be disposed to something, by reason of a
passion, the will cannot be moved in a contrary sense.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 4:7): "Thy lust [Vulg. 'The
lust thereof'] shall be under thee, and thou shalt have dominion over
it." Therefore man's will is not moved of necessity by the lower
appetite.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 9, A. 2), the passion of the
sensitive appetite moves the will, in so far as the will is moved by
its object: inasmuch as, to wit, man through being disposed in such
and such a way by a passion, judges something to be fitting and good,
which he would not judge thus were it not for the passion. Now this
influence of a passion on man occurs in two ways. First, so that his
reason is wholly bound, so that he has not the use of reason: as
happens in those who through a violent access of anger or
concupiscence become furious or insane, just as they may from some
other bodily disorder; since such like passions do not take place
without some change in the body. And of such the same is to be said
as of irrational animals, which follow, of necessity, the impulse of
their passions: for in them there is neither movement of reason, nor,
consequently, of will.

Sometimes, however, the reason is not entirely engrossed by the
passion, so that the judgment of reason retains, to a certain extent,
its freedom: and thus the movement of the will remains in a certain
degree. Accordingly in so far as the reason remains free, and not
subject to the passion, the will's movement, which also remains, does
not tend of necessity to that whereto the passion inclines it.
Consequently, either there is no movement of the will in tha