ore it follows
that the will is a power absolutely incorporeal and immaterial. But it
is evident that no body can act on what is incorporeal, but rather the
reverse: because things incorporeal and immaterial have a power more
formal and more universal than any corporeal things whatever.
Therefore it is impossible for a heavenly body to act directly on the
intellect or will. For this reason Aristotle (De Anima iii, 3)
ascribed to those who held that intellect differs not from sense, the
theory that "such is the will of men, as is the day which the father
of men and of gods bring on" [*Odyssey xviii. 135] (referring to
Jupiter, by whom they understand the entire heavens). For all the
sensitive powers, since they are acts of bodily organs, can be moved
accidentally, by the heavenly bodies, i.e. through those bodies being
moved, whose acts they are.

But since it has been stated (A. 2) that the intellectual appetite is
moved, in a fashion, by the sensitive appetite, the movements of the
heavenly bodies have an indirect bearing on the will; in so far as
the will happens to be moved by the passions of the sensitive
appetite.

Reply Obj. 1: The multiform movements of the human will are reduced
to some uniform cause, which, however, is above the intellect and
will. This can be said, not of any body, but of some superior
immaterial substance. Therefore there is no need for the movement of
the will to be referred to the movement of the heavens, as to its
cause.

Reply Obj. 2: The movements of the human body are reduced, as to
their cause, to the movement of a heavenly body, in so far as the
disposition suitable to a particular movement, is somewhat due to the
influence of heavenly bodies; also, in so far as the sensitive
appetite is stirred by the influence of heavenly bodies; and again,
in so far as exterior bodies are moved in accordance with the
movement of heavenly bodies, at whose presence, the will begins to
will or not to will something; for instance, when the body is
chilled, we begin to wish to make the fire. But this movement of the
will is on the part of the object offered from without: not on the
part of an inward instigation.

Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Cf. I, Q. 84, AA. 6, 7), the sensitive
appetite is the act of a bodily organ. Wherefore there is no reason
why man should not be prone to anger or concupiscence, or some like
passion, by reason of the influence of heavenly bodies, just as by
reason of his n