er nature, which moves all nature by its command, just as in
things endowed with knowledge, the appetite moves the other powers to
their acts. Wherefore it is clear that things void of knowledge,
although they attain an end, have no enjoyment of the end: this is
only for those that are endowed with knowledge.

Now knowledge of the end is twofold: perfect and imperfect. Perfect
knowledge of the end, is that whereby not only is that known which is
the end and the good, but also the universal formality of the end and
the good; and such knowledge belongs to the rational nature alone. On
the other hand, imperfect knowledge is that by which the end and the
good are known in the particular. Such knowledge is in irrational
animals: whose appetitive powers do not command with freedom, but are
moved according to a natural instinct to whatever they apprehend.
Consequently, enjoyment belongs to the rational nature, in a perfect
degree; to irrational animals, imperfectly; to other creatures, not
at all.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking there of perfect enjoyment.

Reply Obj. 2: Enjoyment need not be of the last end simply; but of
that which each one chooses for his last end.

Reply Obj. 3: The sensitive appetite follows some knowledge; not so
the natural appetite, especially in things void of knowledge.

Reply Obj. 4: Augustine is speaking there of imperfect enjoyment.
This is clear from his way of speaking: for he says that "it is not
so absurd to suppose that even beasts enjoy," that is, as it would
be, if one were to say that they "use."
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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 11, Art. 3]

Whether Enjoyment Is Only of the Last End?

Objection 1: It would seem that enjoyment is not only of the last end.
For the Apostle says (Philem. 20): "Yea, brother, may I enjoy thee in
the Lord." But it is evident that Paul had not placed his last end in
a man. Therefore to enjoy is not only of the last end.

Obj. 2: Further, what we enjoy is the fruit. But the Apostle says
(Gal. 5:22): "The fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy, peace," and
other like things, which are not in the nature of the last end.
Therefore enjoyment is not only of the last end.

Obj. 3: Further, the acts of the will reflect on one another; for I
will to will, and I love to love. But to enjoy is an act of the will:
since "it is the will with which we enjoy," as Augustine says (De
Trin. x, 10). Therefore a man enjoys his enjoyment. But the last end