le are so called
because they are certain effects of the Holy Ghost in us, wherefore
they are called "fruits of the spirit": but not as though we are to
enjoy them as our last end. Or we may say with Ambrose that they are
called fruits because "we should desire them for their own sake": not
indeed as though they were not ordained to the last end; but because
they are such that we ought to find pleasure in them.

Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 1, A. 8; Q. 2, A. 7), we speak of
an end in a twofold sense: first, as being the thing itself;
secondly, as the attainment thereof. These are not, of course, two
ends, but one end, considered in itself, and in its relation to
something else. Accordingly God is the last end, as that which is
ultimately sought for: while the enjoyment is as the attainment of
this last end. And so, just as God is not one end, and the enjoyment
of God, another: so it is the same enjoyment whereby we enjoy God,
and whereby we enjoy our enjoyment of God. And the same applies to
created happiness which consists in enjoyment.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 11, Art. 4]

Whether Enjoyment Is Only of the End Possessed?

Objection 1: It would seem that enjoyment is only of the end
possessed. For Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1) that "to enjoy is to
use joyfully, with the joy, not of hope, but of possession." But so
long as a thing is not had, there is joy, not of possession, but of
hope. Therefore enjoyment is only of the end possessed.

Obj. 2: Further, as stated above (A. 3), enjoyment is not properly
otherwise than of the last end: because this alone gives rest to the
appetite. But the appetite has no rest save in the possession of the
end. Therefore enjoyment, properly speaking, is only of the end
possessed.

Obj. 3: Further, to enjoy is to lay hold of the fruit. But one does
not lay hold of the fruit until one is in possession of the end.
Therefore enjoyment is only of the end possessed.

_On the contrary,_ "to enjoy is to adhere lovingly to something for
its own sake," as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4). But this
is possible, even in regard to a thing which is not in our
possession. Therefore it is possible to enjoy the end even though it
be not possessed.

_I answer that,_ To enjoy implies a certain relation of the will to
the last end, according as the will has something by way of last end.
Now an end is possessed in two ways; perfectly and imperfectly.
Perfectl