he end. Thirdly, it
considers the end as the term towards which something is ordained;
and thus "intention" regards the end. For when we speak of intending
to have health, we mean not only that we have it, but that we will
have it by means of something else.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 12, Art. 2]
Whether Intention Is Only of the Last End?
Objection 1: It would seem that intention is only of the last end.
For it is said in the book of Prosper's Sentences (Sent. 100): "The
intention of the heart is a cry to God." But God is the last end of
the human heart. Therefore intention is always regards the last end.
Obj. 2: Further, intention regards the end as the terminus, as stated
above (A. 1, ad 4). But a terminus is something last. Therefore
intention always regards the last end.
Obj. 3: Further, just as intention regards the end, so does
enjoyment. But enjoyment is always of the last end. Therefore
intention is too.
_On the contrary,_ There is but one last end of human wills, viz.
Happiness, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 7). If, therefore, intentions
were only of the last end, men would not have different intentions:
which is evidently false.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 4), intention regards the
end as a terminus of the movement of the will. Now a terminus of
movement may be taken in two ways. First, the very last terminus,
when the movement comes to a stop; this is the terminus of the whole
movement. Secondly, some point midway, which is the beginning of one
part of the movement, and the end or terminus of the other. Thus in
the movement from A to C through B, C is the last terminus, while B
is a terminus, but not the last. And intention can be both.
Consequently though intention is always of the end, it need not be
always of the last end.
Reply Obj. 1: The intention of the heart is called a cry to God, not
that God is always the object of intention, but because He sees our
intention. Or because, when we pray, we direct our intention to God,
which intention has the force of a cry.
Reply Obj. 2: A terminus is something last, not always in respect of
the whole, but sometimes in respect of a part.
Reply Obj. 3: Enjoyment implies rest in the end; and this belongs to
the last end alone. But intention implies movement towards an end,
not rest. Wherefore the comparison proves nothing.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 12, Art. 3]
Whether One Can Intend
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