dge. Therefore intention does too.

Obj. 3: Further, intention implies a kind of ordaining to an end. But
to ordain is an act of reason. Therefore intention belongs not to the
will but to the reason.

Obj. 4: Further, an act of the will is either of the end or of the
means. But the act of the will in respect of the end is called
volition, or enjoyment; with regard to the means, it is choice, from
which intention is distinct. Therefore it is not an act of the will.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 4, 8, 9) that "the
intention of the will unites the sight to the object seen; and the
images retained in the memory, to the penetrating gaze of the soul's
inner thought." Therefore intention is an act of the will.

_I answer that,_ Intention, as the very word denotes, signifies, "to
tend to something." Now both the action of the mover and the movement
of thing moved, tend to something. But that the movement of the thing
moved tends to anything, is due to the action of the mover.
Consequently intention belongs first and principally to that which
moves to the end: hence we say that an architect or anyone who is in
authority, by his command moves others to that which he intends. Now
the will moves all the other powers of the soul to the end, as shown
above (Q. 9, A. 1). Wherefore it is evident that intention, properly
speaking, is an act of the will.

Reply Obj. 1: The eye designates intention figuratively, not because
intention has reference to knowledge, but because it presupposes
knowledge, which proposes to the will the end to which the latter
moves; thus we foresee with the eye whither we should tend with our
bodies.

Reply Obj. 2: Intention is called a light because it is manifest to
him who intends. Wherefore works are called darkness because a man
knows what he intends, but knows not what the result may be, as
Augustine expounds (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 13).

Reply Obj. 3: The will does not ordain, but tends to something
according to the order of reason. Consequently this word "intention"
indicates an act of the will, presupposing the act whereby the reason
orders something to the end.

Reply Obj. 4: Intention is an act of the will in regard to the end.
Now the will stands in a threefold relation to the end. First,
absolutely; and thus we have "volition," whereby we will absolutely
to have health, and so forth. Secondly, it considers the end, as its
place of rest; and thus "enjoyment" regards t