willing of the means.

_I answer that,_ The movement of the will to the end and to the means
can be considered in two ways. First, according as the will is moved
to each of the aforesaid absolutely and in itself. And thus there are
really two movements of the will to them. Secondly, it may be
considered accordingly as the will is moved to the means for the sake
of the end: and thus the movement of the will to the end and its
movement to the means are one and the same thing. For when I say: "I
wish to take medicine for the sake of health," I signify no more than
one movement of my will. And this is because the end is the reason
for willing the means. Now the object, and that by reason of which it
is an object, come under the same act; thus it is the same act of
sight that perceives color and light, as stated above (Q. 8, A. 3, ad
2). And the same applies to the intellect; for if it consider
principle and conclusion absolutely, it considers each by a distinct
act; but when it assents to the conclusion on account of the
principles, there is but one act of the intellect.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of seeing the window and of
seeing, through the window, the passersby, according as the will is
moved to either absolutely.

Reply Obj. 2: The end, considered as a thing, and the means to that
end, are distinct objects of the will. But in so far as the end is
the formal object in willing the means, they are one and the same
object.

Reply Obj. 3: A movement which is one as to the subject, may differ,
according to our way of looking at it, as to its beginning and end,
as in the case of ascent and descent (Phys. iii, 3). Accordingly, in
so far as the movement of the will is to the means, as ordained to
the end, it is called "choice": but the movement of the will to the
end as acquired by the means, is called "intention." A sign of
this is that we can have intention of the end without having
determined the means which are the object of choice.
________________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 12, Art. 5]

Whether Intention Is Within the Competency of Irrational Animals?

Objection 1: It would seem that irrational animals intend the end. For
in things void of reason nature stands further apart from the rational
nature, than does the sensitive nature in irrational animals. But
nature intends the end even in things void of reason, as is proved in
_Phys._ ii, 8. Much more, therefore, do irrational animals intend the