ed actually, but only so in
some respects, and in other respects not, the sight would not of
necessity see such an object: for it might look at that part of the
object which is not actually colored, and thus it would not see it.
Now just as the actually colored is the object of sight, so is good
the object of the will. Wherefore if the will be offered an object
which is good universally and from every point of view, the will
tends to it of necessity, if it wills anything at all; since it
cannot will the opposite. If, on the other hand, the will is offered
an object that is not good from every point of view, it will not tend
to it of necessity. And since lack of any good whatever, is a
non-good, consequently, that good alone which is perfect and lacking
in nothing, is such a good that the will cannot not-will it: and this
is Happiness. Whereas any other particular goods, in so far as they
are lacking in some good, can be regarded as non-goods: and from this
point of view, they can be set aside or approved by the will, which
can tend to one and the same thing from various points of view.

Reply Obj. 1: The sufficient mover of a power is none but that object
that in every respect presents the aspect of the mover of that power.
If, on the other hand, it is lacking in any respect, it will not move
of necessity, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2: The intellect is moved, of necessity, by an object
which is such as to be always and necessarily true: but not by that
which may be either true or false--viz. by that which is contingent:
as we have said of the good.

Reply Obj. 3: The last end moves the will necessarily, because it is
the perfect good. In like manner whatever is ordained to that end,
and without which the end cannot be attained, such as "to be" and "to
live," and the like. But other things without which the end can be
gained, are not necessarily willed by one who wills the end: just as
he who assents to the principle, does not necessarily assent to the
conclusions, without which the principles can still be true.
________________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 10, Art. 3]

Whether the Will Is Moved, of Necessity, by the Lower Appetite?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will is moved of necessity by a
passion of the lower appetite. For the Apostle says (Rom. 7:19): "The
good which I will I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do":
and this is said by reason of concupiscence, which is a passion.
Ther