fruition thereof:
so that the intellect attains this end, as the executive power, but
the will as the motive power, moving (the powers) towards the end and
enjoying the end attained.
Reply Obj. 2: The perfection and end of every other power is
contained in the object of the appetitive power, as the proper is
contained in the common, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 1). Hence the
perfection and end of each power, in so far as it is a good, belongs
to the appetitive power. Wherefore the appetitive power moves the
other powers to their ends; and itself realizes the end, when each of
them reaches the end.
Reply Obj. 3: In delight there are two things: perception of what is
becoming; and this belongs to the apprehensive power; and complacency
in that which is offered as becoming: and this belongs to the
appetitive power, in which power delight is formally completed.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 11, Art. 2]
Whether to Enjoy Belongs to the Rational Creature Alone, or Also to
Irrational Animals?
Objection 1: It would seem that to enjoy belongs to men alone. For
Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22) that "it is given to us men
to enjoy and to use." Therefore other animals cannot enjoy.
Obj. 2: Further, to enjoy relates to the last end. But irrational
animals cannot obtain the last end. Therefore it is not for them to
enjoy.
Obj. 3: Further, just as the sensitive appetite is beneath the
intellectual appetite, so is the natural appetite beneath the
sensitive. If, therefore, to enjoy belongs to the sensitive appetite,
it seems that for the same reason it can belong to the natural
appetite. But this is evidently false, since the latter cannot
delight in anything. Therefore the sensitive appetite cannot enjoy:
and accordingly enjoyment is not possible for irrational animals.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): "It is not so
absurd to suppose that even beasts enjoy their food and any bodily
pleasure."
_I answer that,_ As was stated above (A. 1) to enjoy is not the act
of the power that achieves the end as executor, but of the power that
commands the achievement; for it has been said to belong to the
appetitive power. Now things void of reason have indeed a power of
achieving an end by way of execution, as that by which a heavy body
has a downward tendency, whereas a light body has an upward tendency.
Yet the power of command in respect of the end is not in them, but in
some high
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