ellect there corresponds some one general thing,
which is the true, or being, or "what a thing is." And under good in
general are included many particular goods, to none of which is the
will determined.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 10, Art. 2]

Whether the Will Is Moved, of Necessity, by Its Object?

Objection 1: It seems that the will is moved, of necessity, by its
object. For the object of the will is compared to the will as mover
to movable, as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 10. But a mover, if it be
sufficient, moves the movable of necessity. Therefore the will can be
moved of necessity by its object.

Obj. 2: Further, just as the will is an immaterial power, so is the
intellect: and both powers are ordained to a universal object, as
stated above (A. 1, ad 3). But the intellect is moved, of necessity,
by its object: therefore the will also, by its object.

Obj. 3: Further, whatever one wills, is either the end, or something
ordained to an end. But, seemingly, one wills an end necessarily:
because it is like the principle in speculative matters, to which
principle one assents of necessity. Now the end is the reason for
willing the means; and so it seems that we will the means also
necessarily. Therefore the will is moved of necessity by its object.

_On the contrary,_ The rational powers, according to the Philosopher
(Metaph. ix, 2) are directed to opposites. But the will is a rational
power, since it is in the reason, as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 9.
Therefore the will is directed to opposites. Therefore it is not
moved, of necessity, to either of the opposites.

_I answer that,_ The will is moved in two ways: first, as to the
exercise of its act; secondly, as to the specification of its act,
derived from the object. As to the first way, no object moves the
will necessarily, for no matter what the object be, it is in man's
power not to think of it, and consequently not to will it actually.
But as to the second manner of motion, the will is moved by one
object necessarily, by another not. For in the movement of a power by
its object, we must consider under what aspect the object moves the
power. For the visible moves the sight, under the aspect of color
actually visible. Wherefore if color be offered to the sight, it
moves the sight necessarily: unless one turns one's eyes away; which
belongs to the exercise of the act. But if the sight were confronted
with something not in all respects color