r mover which is
God?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 10, Art. 1]

Whether the Will Is Moved to Anything Naturally?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved to anything
naturally. For the natural agent is condivided with the voluntary
agent, as stated at the beginning of _Phys._ ii, 1. Therefore the will
is not moved to anything naturally.

Obj. 2: Further, that which is natural is in a thing always: as
"being hot" is in fire. But no movement is always in the will.
Therefore no movement is natural to the will.

Obj. 3: Further, nature is determinate to one thing: whereas the will
is referred to opposites. Therefore the will wills nothing naturally.

_On the contrary,_ The movement of the will follows the movement of
the intellect. But the intellect understands some things naturally.
Therefore the will, too, wills some things naturally.

_I answer that,_ As Boethius says (De Duabus Nat.) and the
Philosopher also (Metaph. v, 4) the word "nature" is used in a
manifold sense. For sometimes it stands for the intrinsic principle
in movable things. In this sense nature is either matter or the
material form, as stated in _Phys._ ii, 1. In another sense nature
stands for any substance, or even for any being. And in this sense,
that is said to be natural to a thing which befits it in respect of
its substance. And this is that which of itself is in a thing. Now
all things that do not of themselves belong to the thing in which
they are, are reduced to something which belongs of itself to that
thing, as to their principle. Wherefore, taking nature in this sense,
it is necessary that the principle of whatever belongs to a thing, be
a natural principle. This is evident in regard to the intellect: for
the principles of intellectual knowledge are naturally known. In like
manner the principle of voluntary movements must be something
naturally willed.

Now this is good in general, to which the will tends naturally, as
does each power to its object; and again it is the last end, which
stands in the same relation to things appetible, as the first
principles of demonstrations to things intelligible: and, speaking
generally, it is all those things which belong to the willer
according to his nature. For it is not only things pertaining to the
will that the will desires, but also that which pertains to each
power, and to the entire man. Wherefore man wills naturally not only
the object of the will, b