individuating circumstances. And that
which is done through fear is voluntary, inasmuch as it is here and
now, that is to say, in so far as, under the circumstances, it
hinders a greater evil which was feared; thus the throwing of the
cargo into the sea becomes voluntary during the storm, through fear
of the danger: wherefore it is clear that it is voluntary simply. And
hence it is that what is done out of fear is essentially voluntary,
because its principle is within. But if we consider what is done
through fear, as outside this particular case, and inasmuch as it is
repugnant to the will, this is merely a consideration of the mind.
And consequently what is done through fear is involuntary, considered
in that respect, that is to say, outside the actual circumstances of
the case.

Reply Obj. 1: Things done through fear and compulsion differ not only
according to present and future time, but also in this, that the will
does not consent, but is moved entirely counter to that which is done
through compulsion: whereas what is done through fear, becomes
voluntary, because the will is moved towards it, albeit not for its
own sake, but on account of something else, that is, in order to
avoid an evil which is feared. For the conditions of a voluntary act
are satisfied, if it be done on account of something else voluntary:
since the voluntary is not only what we wish, for its own sake, as an
end, but also what we wish for the sake of something else, as an end.
It is clear therefore that in what is done from compulsion, the will
does nothing inwardly; whereas in what is done through fear, the will
does something. Accordingly, as Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat.
Hom. xxx.] says, in order to exclude things done through fear, a
violent action is defined as not only one, "the princip[le] whereof
is from without," but with the addition, "in which he that suffers
violence concurs not at all"; because the will of him that is in
fear, does concur somewhat in that which he does through fear.

Reply Obj. 2: Things that are such absolutely, remain such, whatever
be added to them; for instance, a cold thing, or a white thing: but
things that are such relatively, vary according as they are compared
with different things. For what is big in comparison with one thing,
is small in comparison with another. Now a thing is said to be
voluntary, not only for its own sake, as it were absolutely; but also
for the sake of something else, as it we