to that particular limb; but not simply, i.e. as to the man
himself.
________________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 6, Art. 6]

Whether Fear Causes Involuntariness Simply?

Objection 1: It would seem that fear causes involuntariness simply.
For just as violence regards that which is contrary to the will at the
time, so fear regards a future evil which is repugnant to the will.
But violence causes involuntariness simply. Therefore fear too causes
involuntariness simply.

Obj. 2: Further, that which is such of itself, remains such, whatever
be added to it: thus what is hot of itself, as long as it
remains, is still hot, whatever be added to it. But that which is done
through fear, is involuntary in itself. Therefore, even with the
addition of fear, it is involuntary.

Obj. 3: Further, that which is such, subject to a condition, is
such in a certain respect; whereas what is such, without any
condition, is such simply: thus what is necessary, subject to a
condition, is necessary in some respect: but what is necessary
absolutely, is necessary simply. But that which is done through
fear, is absolutely involuntary; and is not voluntary, save under a
condition, namely, in order that the evil feared may be avoided.
Therefore that which is done through fear, is involuntary simply.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxx.] and
the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) say that such things as are done
through fear are "voluntary rather than involuntary."

_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) and likewise
Gregory of Nyssa in his book on Man (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxx), such
things are done through fear "are of a mixed character," being partly
voluntary and partly involuntary. For that which is done through fear,
considered in itself, is not voluntary; but it becomes voluntary in
this particular case, in order, namely, to avoid the evil feared.

But if the matter be considered aright, such things are voluntary
rather than involuntary; for they are voluntary simply, but
involuntary in a certain respect. For a thing is said to be simply,
according as it is in act; but according as it is only in
apprehension, it is not simply, but in a certain respect. Now that
which is done through fear, is in act in so far as it is done. For,
since acts are concerned with singulars; and the singular, as such,
is here and now; that which is done is in act, in so far as it is
here and now and under other