res that which previously he
repudiated. Accordingly, that which is done out of fear is
involuntary, to a certain extent, but that which is done from
concupiscence is nowise involuntary. For the man who yields to
concupiscence acts counter to that which he purposed at first, but
not counter to that which he desires now; whereas the timid man acts
counter to that which in itself he desires now.
Reply Obj. 3: If concupiscence were to destroy knowledge altogether,
as happens with those whom concupiscence has rendered mad, it would
follow that concupiscence would take away voluntariness. And yet
properly speaking it would not result in the act being involuntary,
because in things bereft of reason, there is neither voluntary nor
involuntary. But sometimes in those actions which are done from
concupiscence, knowledge is not completely destroyed, because the
power of knowing is not taken away entirely, but only the actual
consideration in some particular possible act. Nevertheless, this
itself is voluntary, according as by voluntary we mean that which is
in the power of the will, for example "not to act" or "not to will,"
and in like manner "not to consider"; for the will can resist the
passion, as we shall state later on (Q. 10, A. 3; Q. 77, A.)
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EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 6, Art. 8]
Whether Ignorance Causes Involuntariness?
Objection 1: It would seem that ignorance does not cause
involuntariness. For "the involuntary act deserves pardon," as
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 24). But sometimes that which is
done through ignorance does not deserve pardon, according to 1 Cor.
14:38: "If any man know not, he shall not be known." Therefore
ignorance does not cause involuntariness.
Obj. 2: Further, every sin implies ignorance; according to Prov.
14:22: "They err, that work evil." If, therefore, ignorance causes
involuntariness, it would follow that every sin is involuntary: which
is opposed to the saying of Augustine, that "every sin is voluntary"
(De Vera Relig. xiv).
Obj. 3: Further, "involuntariness is not without sadness," as
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 24). But some things are done out
of ignorance, but without sadness: for instance, a man may kill a
foe, whom he wishes to kill, thinking at the time that he is killing
a stag. Therefore ignorance does not cause involuntariness.
_On the contrary,_ Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) and the
Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) say that "what is
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