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thing proceeds from another in two ways. First, directly; in which
sense something proceeds from another inasmuch as this other acts;
for instance, heating from heat. Secondly, indirectly; in which sense
something proceeds from another through this other not acting; thus
the sinking of a ship is set down to the helmsman, from his having
ceased to steer. But we must take note that the cause of what follows
from want of action is not always the agent as not acting; but only
then when the agent can and ought to act. For if the helmsman were
unable to steer the ship or if the ship's helm be not entrusted to
him, the sinking of the ship would not be set down to him, although
it might be due to his absence from the helm.
Since, then, the will by willing and acting, is able, and sometimes
ought, to hinder not-willing and not-acting; this not-willing and
not-acting is imputed to, as though proceeding from, the will. And
thus it is that we can have the voluntary without an act; sometimes
without outward act, but with an interior act; for instance, when one
wills not to act; and sometimes without even an interior act, as when
one does not will to act.
Reply Obj. 1: We apply the word "voluntary" not only to that which
proceeds from the will directly, as from its action; but also to that
which proceeds from it indirectly as from its inaction.
Reply Obj. 2: "Not to wish" is said in two senses. First, as though
it were one word, and the infinitive of "I-do-not-wish." Consequently
just as when I say "I do not wish to read," the sense is, "I wish not
to read"; so "not to wish to read" is the same as "to wish not to
read," and in this sense "not to wish" implies involuntariness.
Secondly it is taken as a sentence: and then no act of the will is
affirmed. And in this sense "not to wish" does not imply
involuntariness.
Reply Obj. 3: Voluntariness requires an act of knowledge in the same
way as it requires an act of will; namely, in order that it be in
one's power to consider, to wish and to act. And then, just as not to
wish, and not to act, when it is time to wish and to act, is
voluntary, so is it voluntary not to consider.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 6, Art. 4]
Whether Violence Can Be Done to the Will?
Objection 1: It would seem that violence can be done to the will. For
everything can be compelled by that which is more powerful. But there
is something, namely, God, that is more powerful than th
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