consider those acts which are proper to
man; secondly, those acts which are common to man and the other
animals, and are called Passions. The first of these points offers a
twofold consideration: (1) What makes a human act? (2) What
distinguishes human acts?

And since those acts are properly called human which are voluntary,
because the will is the rational appetite, which is proper to man; we
must consider acts in so far as they are voluntary.

First, then, we must consider the voluntary and involuntary in
general; secondly, those acts which are voluntary, as being elicited
by the will, and as issuing from the will immediately; thirdly, those
acts which are voluntary, as being commanded by the will, which issue
from the will through the medium of the other powers.

And because voluntary acts have certain circumstances, according to
which we form our judgment concerning them, we must first consider
the voluntary and the involuntary, and afterwards, the circumstances
of those acts which are found to be voluntary or involuntary. Under
the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there is anything voluntary in human acts?

(2) Whether in irrational animals?

(3) Whether there can be voluntariness without any action?

(4) Whether violence can be done to the will?

(5) Whether violence causes involuntariness?

(6) Whether fear causes involuntariness?

(7) Whether concupiscence causes involuntariness?

(8) Whether ignorance causes involuntariness?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 6, Art. 1]

Whether There Is Anything Voluntary in Human Acts?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is nothing voluntary in human
acts. For that is voluntary "which has its principle within itself."
as Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Natura Hom. xxxii.], Damascene (De
Fide Orth. ii, 24), and Aristotle (Ethic. iii, 1) declare. But the
principle of human acts is not in man himself, but outside him: since
man's appetite is moved to act, by the appetible object which is
outside him, and is as a "mover unmoved" (De Anima iii, 10).
Therefore there is nothing voluntary in human acts.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 2) proves that in
animals no new movement arises that is not preceded by a motion from
without. But all human acts are new, since none is eternal.
Consequently, the principle of all human acts is from without: and
therefore there is nothing voluntary in them.

Obj. 3: Furt