. 2]

Whether Use Is to Be Found in Irrational Animals?

Objection 1: It would seem that use is to be found in irrational
animals. For it is better to enjoy than to use, because, as Augustine
says (De Trin. x, 10): "We use things by referring them to something
else which we are to enjoy." But enjoyment is to be found in
irrational animals, as stated above (Q. 11, A. 2). Much more,
therefore, is it possible for them to use.

Obj. 2: Further, to apply the members to action is to use them. But
irrational animals apply their members to action; for instance, their
feet, to walk; their horns, to strike. Therefore it is possible for
irrational animals to use.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): "None but a
rational animal can make use of a thing."

_I answer that,_ as stated above (A. 1), to use is to apply an active
principle to action: thus to consent is to apply the appetitive
movement to the desire of something, as stated above (Q. 15, AA. 1,
2, 3). Now he alone who has the disposal of a thing, can apply it to
something else; and this belongs to him alone who knows how to refer
it to something else, which is an act of the reason. And therefore
none but a rational animal consents and uses.

Reply Obj. 1: To enjoy implies the absolute movement of the appetite
to the appetible: whereas to use implies a movement of the appetite
to something as directed to something else. If therefore we compare
use and enjoyment in respect of their objects, enjoyment is better
than use; because that which is appetible absolutely is better than
that which is appetible only as directed to something else. But if we
compare them in respect of the apprehensive power that precedes them,
greater excellence is required on the part of use: because to direct
one thing to another is an act of reason; whereas to apprehend
something absolutely is within the competency even of sense.

Reply Obj. 2: Animals by means of their members do something from
natural instinct; not through knowing the relation of their members
to these operations. Wherefore, properly speaking, they do not apply
their members to action, nor do they use them.
________________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 16, Art. 3]

Whether Use Regards Also the Last End?

Objection 1: It would seem that use can regard also the last end. For
Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11): "Whoever enjoys, uses." But man
enjoys the last end. Therefore he uses the last end.

Obj. 2: F