pproval, then consent and choice do not differ in reality, but only
in our way of looking at them; so that we call it consent, according
as we approve of doing that thing; but choice according as we prefer
it to those that do not meet with our approval.
________________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 15, Art. 4]

Whether Consent to the Act Belongs Only to the Higher Part of the
Soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that consent to the act does not always
belong to the higher reason. For "delight follows action, and
perfects it, just as beauty perfects youth" [*_oion tois akmaiois he
hora_--as youthful vigor perfects a man in his prime] (Ethic. x, 4).
But consent to delight belongs to the lower reason, as Augustine says
(De Trin. xii, 12). Therefore consent to the act does not belong only
to the higher reason.

Obj. 2: Further, an act to which we consent is said to be voluntary.
But it belongs to many powers to produce voluntary acts. Therefore
the higher reason is not alone in consenting to the act.

Obj. 3: Further, "the higher reason is that which is intent on the
contemplation and consultation of things eternal," as Augustine says
(De Trin. xii, 7). But man often consents to an act not for eternal,
but for temporal reasons, or even on account of some passion of the
soul. Therefore consent to an act does not belong to the higher
reason alone.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12): "It is
impossible for man to make up his mind to commit a sin, unless that
mental faculty which has the sovereign power of urging his members
to, or restraining them from, act, yield to the evil deed and become
its slave."

_I answer that,_ The final decision belongs to him who holds the
highest place, and to whom it belongs to judge of the others; for as
long as judgment about some matter remains to be pronounced, the
final decision has not been given. Now it is evident that it belongs
to the higher reason to judge of all: since it is by the reason that
we judge of sensible things; and of things pertaining to human
principles we judge according to Divine principles, which is the
function of the higher reason. Wherefore as long as a man is
uncertain whether he resists or not, according to Divine principles,
no judgment of the reason can be considered in the light of a final
decision. Now the final decision of what is to be done is consent to
the act. Therefore consent to the act belongs to the higher reason;
but in