o use the end for the purpose of attaining it, as stated
above. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10) that "this love, delight,
felicity, or happiness, is called use by him."
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 16, Art. 4]

Whether Use Precedes Choice?

Objection 1: It would seem that use precedes choice. For nothing
follows after choice, except execution. But use, since it belongs to
the will, precedes execution. Therefore it precedes choice also.

Obj. 2: Further, the absolute precedes the relative. Therefore the
less relative precedes the more relative. But choice implies two
relations: one, of the thing chosen, in relation to the end; the
other, of the thing chosen, in respect of that to which it is
preferred; whereas use implies relation to the end only. Therefore
use precedes choice.

Obj. 3: Further, the will uses the other powers in so far as it
removes them. But the will moves itself, too, as stated above (Q. 9,
A. 3). Therefore it uses itself, by applying itself to act. But it
does this when it consents. Therefore there is use in consent. But
consent precedes choice as stated above (Q. 15, A. 3, ad 3).
Therefore use does also.

_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "the
will after choosing has an impulse to the operation, and afterwards
it uses (the powers)." Therefore use follows choice.

_I answer that,_ The will has a twofold relation to the thing willed.
One, according as the thing willed is, in a way, in the willing
subject, by a kind of proportion or order to the thing willed.
Wherefore those things that are naturally proportionate to a certain
end, are said to desire that end naturally. Yet to have an end thus
is to have it imperfectly. Now every imperfect thing tends to
perfection. And therefore both the natural and the voluntary appetite
tend to have the end in reality; and this is to have it perfectly.
This is the second relation of the will to the thing willed.

Now the thing willed is not only the end, but also the means. And the
last act that belongs to the first relation of the will to the means,
is choice; for there the will becomes fully proportionate, by willing
the means fully. Use, on the other hand, belongs to the second
relation of the will, in respect of which it tends to the realization
of the thing willed. Wherefore it is evident that use follows choice;
provided that by use we mean the will's use of the executive power in
moving it. Bu