serves and ammunition being sent to
our adversaries. The absence of co-operation on the part of the
navy in the terrible battles the troops on the Western front will
again have to face will have a most _injurious_ effect on their
_moral_.

The objections put forward as to the effect the proceeding might
have on America are met in military circles by the assumption that
America will take good care not to go to war; that she, in fact,
would not be able to do so. The unfortunate failure of the United
States military machine in the conflict with Mexico clearly proves
what is to be expected from America in that respect. Even a
possible breaking off relations with America does not necessarily
signify war.

Meanwhile all the leading naval authorities reassert that they may
be relied on, even though they are not considered capable of
crushing England, at least to be able, _before_ America can come
in, so to weaken the British Island Empire that only one desire
will be left to English politicians, that of seating themselves
with us at the Conference table.

To this the Chancellor asked who would give him a guarantee that
the navy was right and in what position should we find ourselves
in case the admirals were mistaken, whereupon the Admiralty
promptly asked what sort of position the Chancellor expected to
find when autumn arrived without having made a proper use of the
U-boats and we found ourselves, through exhaustion, compelled to
_beg_ for peace.

And thus the scales went up and down, weighing the chances for or
against the U-boat war, and there was no possibility of positively
determining which decision was the right one.

Doubtless the German Government in the near future will be
constrained to take up a definite standpoint respecting the
question, and it is obvious--whatever the decision may be--that we
also shall be largely involved. Nevertheless, it appears to me
that when the German Government does approach us in that
connection we should act with all possible reserve. As the matter
now stands, a positive decision as to which course is the right
one is not possible. I have, therefore, thought it inadvisable to
take side definitely with either party and thus remove much of the
responsibility from the German Government and render it possible
for them to lay it upon us.

The Imperial and Royal Ambassador,

G. HOHENLOHE, M.P.

Th