the enemy countries as
we did.

I received about that time a letter from Tisza which contained the
following passage:--

The varied information received from the enemy countries leaves no
doubt that the war is drawing to a close. It is now above all
essential to keep a steady nerve and play the game to the end with
_sangfroid_. Let there be no signs of weakness. It is not from a
love of humanity in general that our enemies have become more
peacefully inclined, but because they realise that we cannot be
crushed.

I beg of you no longer to give vent to the sentiments in your
report of April 12. A pessimistic tendency evinced now by the
leader of our foreign affairs would ruin everything. I know that
you are prudent, but I beg you to use your influence so that both
His Majesty and his entourage may show a confident front to the
world. And again, no one will have anything to say to us if they
cease to believe in our powers of resistance--and are not
persuaded that our Alliance rests on a solid foundation.

It was evident that the only right tactics were to make the supremest
efforts at the front and throughout the country, on the one hand, in
order to hold the situation a little longer, and, on the other, to
persuade the enemy that, in spite of the favourable situation, we were
prepared for peace without conquest. To appoint Hebel to the German
military Commission to carry out this last procedure seemed devoid of
sense. Neither did I expect to gain much from recent intervention in
the Wilhelmstrasse, and endeavoured therefore to put myself in direct
touch with the German Reichstag.

One of my political friends who had numerous and excellent connections
with the German Reichstag put himself into communication with
different leaders in Berlin and explained to them the situation in the
Monarchy. It was understood that this gentleman was not acting for the
Ministry, but presenting his own impressions and views. He was
enjoined to be very cautious, as any indiscretion might have
incalculable consequences. If the Entente were to imagine that we were
thinking of ending the war, not for love of peace but because we
simply could not hold out any longer, all efforts would have been
vain. In that respect, Tisza was perfectly right. It was, therefore,
absolutely necessary that the person to whom this delicate mission had
been entrusted should act in such a manner as would keep it a secret
from the