engthened the situation for the war-keen military party, who, with
increased vehemence, maintained the point that all talk of peace was a
mistake, and that the fighting must go on to the end.

In the winter of 1917, Italy made a slight advance. What territorial
concessions was the Monarchy prepared to make? This did not proceed
from the Italian Government, but was a step taken by a private
individual which was communicated to me through a friendly Government.
It is extremely difficult to judge of the true value of such a step. A
Government can make use of a private individual to take the first
step--it will probably do so when intercourse is desired; but it may
also be that a private person, without instructions from, or the
knowledge of, his Government, might do the same. Instances of the
latter occurred frequently during my term of office.

I always held the standpoint that any such tentative steps for peace,
even when a ministerial source could not be proved _a priori_, should
be treated with prudence, but in a friendly spirit. In the
above-mentioned case, however, the fact was that Italy neither could
separate from her Allies, nor did she wish to do so. Had that been her
purpose, it would have involved her in a conflict with England, whose
aim in war was the conquest of Germany and not any Italian
aspirations. A separate peace with Italy--her separation from her
Allies--was entirely out of the question, but a general peace would
have been possible if the Western Powers could have come to an
understanding with Germany.

The only object gained by that appeal would have been to confirm the
extent of our exhaustion from the war. Had I answered that I was ready
to give up this or that province, it would have been interpreted as a
conclusive symptom of our increasing weakness, and would not have
brought peace any nearer, but rather kept it at a greater distance.

I answered, therefore, in friendly tone that the Monarchy did not aim
at conquests, and that I was ready to negotiate on the basis of
pre-war conditions of possession. No answer was sent.

After the downfall I was told by a person, certainly not competent to
judge, that my tactics had been mistaken, as Italy would have
separated from her Allies and concluded a separate peace. Further
accounts given in this chapter prove the injustice of the reproof. But
it is easy now to confirm the impression that there was not a single
moment while the war lasted when Ital