felt as safe
about Radoslawoff as about Talaat Pasha; but in both countries other
forces were at work.

The suspicions aroused in our friends concerning our plans were a
further disadvantage, certainly only of a technical nature, but yet
not to be underestimated. Our various agents worked splendidly, but it
lay in the nature of the case that their dealings were more protracted
than those carried out by the Foreign Minister himself. According to
the course taken by the conversations, they were obliged to seek fresh
instructions; they were more tied, and therefore forced to assume a
more halting attitude than a responsible leader would have to do. In
the summer of 1917, therefore, I suggested going to Switzerland
myself, where negotiations were proceeding. But my journey could not
have been kept secret, and if an effort had been made to do so it
would have been all the more certain to arouse suspicion, owing to the
mistrust already awakened. But not in Berlin. I believe I still held
the confidence of the leading men in Berlin sufficiently to avert
that. I should have explained the situation to the Imperial
Chancellor, and that would have sufficed. In Turkey and Bulgaria the
case was different.

One party in Bulgaria favoured the Entente. If Bulgaria was under the
impression that our group was falling asunder she would have staked
everything to try and save herself by a separate peace. In
Constantinople, too, there was an Entente group. Talaat and Enver were
as reliable as they were strong. But a journey undertaken by me to
Switzerland in the conditions described might prove to be the alarm
signal for a general _sauve qui peut_. But the very suggestion that
the two Balkan countries would act as they supposed we should do would
have sufficed to destroy any attempt at peace in Paris and London.

The willingness to prepare for peace on the part of the enemy declined
visibly during the summer. It was evident from many trifling signs,
separately of small import, collectively of much. In the summer of
1917, too, the first horror of the U-boat warfare began to grow less.
It was seen by the enemy that it could not accomplish what he had
first feared, and that again put life into the desire for a final
military victory.

These two facts together probably contributed to fan back the peace
wind blowing from the West. Among other things, the Armand-Revertera
negotiations were proceeding the whole time. It is not yet the moment