he was prominent; but all the prejudices and faults of the Magyar
way of thinking spoilt him.

Hungary and her Constitution--dualism--were one of our misfortunes in
the war.

Had the Archduke Franz Ferdinand had no other plan but that of doing
away with dualism, he would on that account alone have merited love
and admiration. In Aehrenthal's and Berchtold's time Hungarian policy
settled the Serbian disputes; it made an alliance with Roumania an
impossibility; it accomplished the food blockade in Austria during the
war; prevented all internal reforms; and, finally, at the last moment,
through Karolyi's petty shortsighted selfishness, the front was
beaten. This severe judgment on Hungary's influence on the war remains
true, in spite of the undoubtedly splendid deeds of the Magyar troops.
The Hungarian is of a strong, courageous, and manly disposition;
therefore, almost always an excellent soldier; but, unfortunately, in
the course of the last fifty years, Hungarian policy has done more
injury than the Hungarian soldier possibly could make good in the war.
Once, during the war, a Hungarian met my reproaches with the rejoinder
that we could be quite sure about the Hungarians, they were so firmly
linked to Austria. "Yes," said I; "Hungary is firmly linked to us, but
like a stone a drowning man has tied round his own neck."

If we had not lost the war a fight to the death with the Magyars would
have been inevitable, because it is impossible to conceive that any
sensible European _consortium_ would consent to be brought into
partnership with Magyar aspirations and plans for dominion.

But, of course, during the war an open fight with Budapest was
impossible.

Whether the nations that once composed the Habsburg Empire will ever
be reunited is an open question; should it come to pass, may a kind
fate preserve us from a return of dualism.

2

On December 26, 1916--four days after entering upon office--I received
a letter from Tisza in which he imparted to me his views on the
tactics to be observed:

All the European neutrals feel that they are more seriously
threatened by England than by us. The events in Greece, Roumania,
etc., as well as England's commercial tyranny, act in our favour,
and the difference of our attitude to the peace plans as compared
with that of the Entente--if consistently and cleverly carried
out--will secure neutral sympathy for our group of Powers.

From this point of view I see