FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   108   109   110   111   112   113   114   115   116   117   118   119   120   121   122   123   124   125   126   127   128   129   130   131   132  
133   134   135   136   137   138   139   140   141   142   143   144   145   146   147   148   149   150   151   152   153   154   155   156   157   >>   >|  
ssary to relieve the land army by recklessly bringing the navy into the line of action. If these fears are justified, then most certainly should all other considerations be put on one side and the risk ensuing from the ruthless employment of the U-boats be accepted. Both Count Czernin and Count Tisza expressed their grave doubts in this connection. To meet the case, the Hungarian Prime Minister pointed out the necessity of immediately starting propagandist activities in the neutral countries and particularly in America, by which the Central Powers' political methods and aims would be presented to them in a proper light; and then later, after introducing unrestricted U-boat warfare, it would be seen that no other choice was left to the peaceful tendencies of the Quadruple Alliance as the means for a speedy ending of the struggle between the nations. The leaders of the foreign policy agreed to take the necessary steps in that direction, and remarked that certain arrangements had already been made. Admiral Haus agreed _unreservedly_ with the arguments of the German Navy, as he declared that _no great anxiety need be felt_ as to the likelihood of America's joining in with military force, and finally pointed out that, on the part of the Entente, a ruthless torpedoing of hospital and transport ships had been practised for some time past in the Adriatic. The Admiral urged that this fact be properly recognised and dealt with, to which the Foreign Affairs leaders on both sides gave their consent. The Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in conclusion, said that the definite decision to be taken must be left to the conclusions arrived at by both sovereigns, whereupon the 26th inst. was fixed for a meeting to be held for that purpose. After the general discussion, I had a private talk with the Emperor, and found that he still had the same aversion to that means of warfare and the same fears as to the result. We knew, however, that Germany had definitely made up her mind to start the campaign in any case, and that all our arguments would be of no practical value. It remained to be decided whether we should join them or not. Owing to the small number of our U-boats, our holding aside would not have had any great effect on the final issue of the experiment, and for a moment I entertained the idea of proposing to the Emperor that we should separate from Germany on th
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   108   109   110   111   112   113   114   115   116   117   118   119   120   121   122   123   124   125   126   127   128   129   130   131   132  
133   134   135   136   137   138   139   140   141   142   143   144   145   146   147   148   149   150   151   152   153   154   155   156   157   >>   >|  



Top keywords:

Germany

 

Minister

 

pointed

 

Emperor

 

Admiral

 

arguments

 

Foreign

 

Affairs

 

leaders

 

agreed


warfare

 

America

 

ruthless

 

effect

 

properly

 

recognised

 

consent

 

definite

 
decision
 

number


conclusion

 
holding
 

Austrian

 

practised

 

transport

 

hospital

 

Entente

 

torpedoing

 

separate

 
entertained

moment
 

Adriatic

 

proposing

 

experiment

 
practical
 
finally
 
private
 

decided

 
general
 

discussion


remained

 

aversion

 

result

 

campaign

 

arrived

 

conclusions

 

sovereigns

 

purpose

 

meeting

 

direction