to speak of the negotiations which in the spring of 1918, together
with the letters of the Emperor to Prince Sixtus, created such a
sensation. But this much must be stated: that Revertera in the
negotiations proved himself to be an equally correct as efficient
agent who acted exactly according to the instructions he received from
the Ballplatz. Our various attempts to take up the threads of peace
when emanating from the Ballplatz were always intended for our entire
group of Powers.

Naturally, it was not in the interests of the Entente to _prevent_ us
from separating from Germany, and when the impression was produced in
London and Paris unofficially that we were giving Germany up, we
ourselves thus used _sabotage_ in the striving for a general peace;
for it would, of course, have been pleasing to the Entente to see
Germany, her chief enemy, isolated.

There was a twofold and terrible mistake in thus trifling with the
idea of a separate peace. First of all, it could not release us from
the terms of the Pact of London, and yet it spoiled the atmosphere for
negotiating a general peace. At the time when these events were being
enacted, I presumed, but only knew for certain later, that Italy, in
any case, would claim the promises made to her.

In the spring of 1917 Ribot and Lloyd George conferred with Orlando on
the subject, when at St. Jean de Maurienne, and endeavoured to modify
the terms in case of our separating from Germany. Orlando refused, and
insisted on his view that, even in the event of a separate peace, we
should still have to yield up Trieste and the Tyrol as far as the
Brenner Pass to Italy, and thus have to pay an impossible price. And
secondly, these separatist tactics would break up our forces, and had
already begun to do so.

When a person starts running away in a fight he but too easily drags
others with him. I do not doubt that the Bulgarian negotiations,
opened with the purpose of taking soundings, were connected with the
foregoing events.

The effect of this well-meant but secret and dilettante policy was
that we suggested to the Entente a willingness to separate from our
Allies, and lost our position in the struggle for a separate peace.
For we saw that in separating from Germany we could not escape being
crippled; that, therefore, a separate peace was impossible, and that
we had dealt a death-blow at the still intact Quadruple Alliance.

Later I had information from England relating to the off