tus quo_," that form would be a very
suitable basis for negotiations. This would not exclude the
desired possibility of retaining the present frontiers, and by
negotiating bring former enemy economic territory into close
economic and military conjunction with Germany--this would refer
to Courland, Lithuania and Poland--and thus secure Germany's
frontiers and give a guarantee for her vital needs on the
continent and overseas.

Germany is ready to evacuate the occupied French territory, but
must reserve to herself the right, _by means of the peace
negotiations, to the economic exploitation of the territory of
Longwy and Briey_, if not through direct incorporation, by a legal
grant to exploit. We are not in a position to cede to France any
noteworthy districts in Alsace-Lorraine.

I should wish to have a free hand in the negotiations in the
matter of _connecting Belgium with Germany in a military and
economic sense_. The terms that I read out, taken from notes at
the Kreuznach negotiations--the military control of Belgium until
the conclusion of a defensive and offensive Alliance with Germany,
the acquisition of Liege (or a long-term rental thereof)--were
the maximum claims of the Supreme Military and Naval Command. The
Supreme Military Command agrees with me that these terms or
similar ones can only be secured if peace can be enforced on
England. But we are of opinion that a vast amount of economic and
military influence must be brought to bear in Belgium in the
matter of the negotiations and would perhaps not meet with much
resistance, because Belgium, from economic distress, will come to
see that her being joined to Germany is the best guarantee for a
prosperous future.

As regards Poland, I note that the confidential hint from Your
Excellency to give up Galicia and enrol it in the new Polish State
is subject to the ceding of portions of Alsace-Lorraine to France,
which was to be as a counter-sacrifice, but must be considered as
out of the question. The development of Poland as an independent
State must be carried out in the sense of the proclamation of
November 5, 1916. Whether this development will prove to be an
actual advantage for Germany or will become a great danger for the
future will be tested later. There are already many signs of
danger, and what is particularly to be feared is that the
Austro-Hungarian Government cannot notify