y's
internal conditions, as they must not be effected through external
pressure. When I, forced thereto by the distress due to lack of
provisions, yielded to Ukrainian wishes and notified the Austrian
Ministry of the Ukrainian desire to divide Galicia in two, Tisza was
fully in accordance therewith. He went even further. He opposed any
expansion of the Monarchy as it might weaken Hungary's influence. All
his life he was an opponent of the Austro-Polish solution, and a
mortal enemy of the tripartist project; he intended that Poland at
most should rank as an Austrian province, but would prefer to make her
over to Germany. He did not even wish Roumania to be joined with
Hungary, as that would weaken the Magyar influence in Hungary. He
looked upon it as out of the question to grant the Serbians access to
the sea, because he wanted the Serbian agricultural products when he
was in need of them; nor would he leave an open door for the Serbian
pigs, as he did not wish the price of the Hungarian to be lowered.
Tisza went still further. He was a great stickler for equality in
making appointments to foreign diplomatic posts, but I could not pay
much heed to that. If I considered the Austrian X better fitted for
the post of ambassador than the Hungarian Y, I selected him in spite
of eventual disagreement.

This trait in the Hungarian, though legally well founded, was
unbearable and not to be maintained in war, and led to various
disputes between Tisza and myself; and now that he is dead, these
scenes leave me only a feeling of the deepest regret for many a hasty
word that escaped me. We afterwards made a compromise. Tisza promised
never to interfere except in cases of the greatest urgency, and I
promised to take no important step without his approval. Soon after
this arrangement he was dismissed by the Emperor for very different
reasons.

I greatly regretted his dismissal, in spite of the difficulties he had
caused me. To begin with, the Magyar-central standpoint was not a
speciality of Tisza's; all Magyar politicians upheld it. Secondly,
Tisza had one great point in his favour: he had no wish to prolong the
war for the purpose of conquest; he wished for a rectification of the
Roumanian frontier and nothing beyond that. If it had come to peace
negotiations, he would have supported me in taking as a basis the
_status quo ante_. His support--and that was the third reason--was of
great value, for he was a man who knew how to fight.