e.

It is possible to turn and steer the Entente course if thought
feasible; but then courage would be needed to make the turn fully.
Nothing is more stupid than trifling with treachery and not
carrying it out; we lose all ground in Berlin and gain nothing
either in London or Paris. But why should I write all this--_you_
share my opinions; I do not need to convert you. We will talk
about Stockholm again.--In true friendship, your old

CZERNIN.

As a matter of fact, Tisza in this instance allowed himself to be
quite converted, and raised no objections as to the Hungarian Social
Democrats. The negative result of the Stockholm Congress is known.

As already mentioned, it is at present still impossible to discuss in
detail the various negotiations and attempts at peace. Besides the
negotiations between Revertera and Armand, other tentative efforts
were made. For instance, the interviews already alluded to between the
Ambassador Mennsdorff and General Smuts, which were referred to in
the English Parliament. I do not consider it right to say more about
the matter here. But I can and will repeat the point of view which was
at the bottom of all our peace efforts since the summer of 1917, and
which finally wrecked them all.

The last report cited reflected the views of the Entente quite
correctly. With Germany there was at present no possibility of
intercourse. France insisted on the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine,
and the entire Entente demanded the abolition of German militarism.
Neither would Germany be allowed to retain her colonies. But Germany
was not yet "ripe" for this demand to be made. In the opinion of the
Entente, therefore, any debate on the subject would be useless. For us
the case was different. The impression prevailed that we could
conclude a separate peace providing we were ready to make sacrifices.
The London terms had created a situation which must be accepted.
Concessions to Roumania, the cession of Trieste and the Trentino, as
well as the German South Tyrol, to Italy, and concessions to the
Southern Slav state would be unavoidable, besides reforms in the
Monarchy on a federal basis. Our answer was that a one-sided
concession of Austro-Hungarian and German territory in that form was,
naturally, not possible. But still we thought that, under certain
premises in the territorial questions, an agreement might perhaps not
meet with insurmountable difficulties. As a matter of course, however,