e
minister, he must go.

The control of foreign policy in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was in
the hands of the delegations.

Besides which, however, there existed in the Hungarian Constitution a
regulation to the effect that the Hungarian Prime Minister was
responsible to the country for the foreign policy, and, consequently,
the "foreign policy of the Monarchy had to be carried out, in
conjunction, by the then Minister for Foreign Affairs in office and
the Prime Minister."

It depended entirely on the personality of the Hungarian Prime
Minister how he observed the regulation. Under Burian's regime it had
become the custom for all telegrams and news, even of the most secret
nature, to be communicated at once to Count Tisza, who then brought
his influence to bear on all decisions and tactical events. Tisza
possessed a most extraordinary capacity for work. He always found time
to occupy himself very thoroughly with foreign policy, notwithstanding
his own numerous departmental duties, and it was necessary, therefore,
to gain his consent to every step taken. The control of our foreign
policy was, therefore, twofold--both by the delegation and the Prime
Minister.

Great as was my esteem and respect for Count Tisza and close the
friendship between us, still his constant supervision and
intervention put boundless difficulties in the way of the discharge of
business. It was not easy, even in normal times, to contend with, on
top of all the existing difficulties that confront a Minister for
Foreign Affairs; in war, it became an impossibility. The unqualified
presumption behind such twofold government would have been that the
Hungarian Prime Minister should consider all questions from the
standpoint of the entire Monarchy, and not from that of the Magyar
centre, a presumption which Tisza ignored like all other Hungarians.
He did not deny it. He has often told me that he knew no patriotism
save the Hungarian, but that it was in the interests of Hungary to
keep together with Austria; therefore, he saw most things with a
crooked vision. Never would he have ceded one single square metre of
Hungarian territory; but he raised no objection to the projected
cession of Galicia. He would rather have let the whole world be ruined
than give up Transylvania; but he took no interest whatever in the
Tyrol.

Apart from that, he applied different rules for Austria than for
Hungary. He would not allow of the slightest alteration in Hungar