r pressure from
the Entente, should become very much worse. It would be a change
for the worse for us if our Allies or the neutral states, contrary
to our expectations and hopes, were to experience such shortage as
would cause them to turn to us. To a certain extent, this is
already the case; a further increase of their claims would greatly
prejudice our economic position and in certain cases endanger it.
It must be admitted that the situation in the fourth year of war
in general is more difficult than in the third year. The most
earnest endeavours, therefore, will be made to bring about a peace
as soon as possible.

Nevertheless, our genuine desire for peace must not lead us to
come forward with a fresh peace proposal. That, in my opinion,
would be a great tactical error. Our _demarche_ for peace last
December found sympathy in the neutral states, but it was answered
by our adversaries raising their demands. A fresh step of the kind
would be put down to our weakness and would prolong the war; any
peace advances must come now from the enemy.

The leading motive in my foreign policy will always be the
watchful care of our Alliance with Austria-Hungary that the storm
of war has made still stronger, and a trusting, friendly and loyal
co-operation with the leading men of the Allied Monarchy. If the
spirit of the Alliance--and in this I know Your Excellency
agrees--remains on the same high level as heretofore, even our
enemies would see that it was impossible for one of the Allies to
agree to any separate negotiations offered to him, unless he
states beforehand that the discussion would only be entered into
if the object were a general peace. If this were clearly laid down
there could be no reason why one of the Allies should not listen
to such proposal from the enemy and with him discuss preparations
for peace.

At present no decided line of action can be specified for such a
proceeding. Your Excellency was good enough to ask me whether the
reinstatement of the _status quo_ would be a suitable basis on
which to start negotiations. My standpoint in this matter is as
follows: I have already stated in the Reichstag that Germany is
not striving for any great changes in power after the war, and is
ready to negotiate provided the enemy does not demand the cession
of any German territory; with such a conception of the term
"reinstatement of the _sta