icial view of
the situation there, which differed very much from the optimistic
confidential reports, and proved that the desire for peace was not so
strong. It will easily be understood that for us the English policy
was always the most interesting. England's entry into the war had made
the situation so dangerous that an understanding arrived at with
her--that is, an understanding between England and Germany through our
intervention--would have put an end to the war.

This information was to the effect that England was less than ever
inclined to confer with Germany until the two cardinal points had been
guaranteed--the cession of Alsace-Lorraine and the abolition of German
militarism. The former was a French claim, and England must and would
support France in this to her very utmost; the second claim was
necessary in the interests of the future peace of the world. Germany's
military strength was always estimated very highly in England, but the
army's deeds in this war had surpassed all expectations. The military
successes had encouraged the growth of the military spirit. The peace
resolution passed in the Reichstag proved nothing, or at any rate, not
enough, for the Reichstag is not the real exponent of the Empire in
the outside world; it became paralysed through an unofficial
collateral Government, the generals, who possessed the greater power.
Certain statements made by General Ludendorff--so the Entente
said--proved that Germany did not wish for an honourable peace of
understanding. Besides this the Wilhelmstrasse did not associate
itself with the majority in the Reichstag. The war was not being waged
against the German nation, but against its militarism, and to conclude
peace with the latter would be impossible. It appeared, further, that
in no circumstances would England restore Germany's colonies. So far
as the Monarchy was concerned, England appeared to be ready to
conclude a separate peace with her, though subject to the promises
made to her own Allies. According to the latter there was much
territory to be given up to Italy, Serbia and Roumania. But in
exchange we might reckon on a sort of annexation of newly made states
like Poland.

This information left no doubt that England was not then thinking of
making advances to Germany; the fear of Prussian militarism was at the
bottom of her reasons for refusing. My impression was that, through a
more favourable continuous development, a settlement and understandi