serious disturbances
occur, either here or in Germany, it will be impossible to conceal
the fact from the Entente, and from that moment all further
efforts to secure peace will be defeated.

I do not think that the internal situation in Germany is widely
different from what it is here. I am only afraid that the military
circles in Berlin are deceiving themselves in certain matters. I
am firmly convinced that Germany, too, like ourselves, has reached
the limit of her strength, and the responsible political leaders
in Berlin do not seek to deny it.

I am firmly persuaded that, if Germany were to attempt to embark
on another winter campaign, there would be an upheaval in the
interior of the country which, to my mind, would be far worse than
a peace concluded by the Monarchs. If the Monarchs of the Central
Powers are not able to conclude peace within the next few months,
it will be done for them by their people, and then will the tide
of revolution sweep away all that for which our sons and brothers
fought and died.

I do not wish to make any _oratio pro domo_, but I beg Your
Majesty graciously to remember that I, the only one to predict the
Roumanian war two years before, spoke to deaf ears, and that when
I, two months before the war broke out, prophesied almost the very
day when it would begin, nobody would believe me. I am just as
convinced of my present diagnosis as I was of the former one, and
I cannot too insistently urge you not to estimate too lightly the
dangers that I see ahead.

Without a doubt, the American declaration of war has greatly
aggravated the situation. It may be many months before America can
throw any noteworthy forces into the field, but the moral fact,
the fact that the Entente has the hope of fresh forces, brings the
situation to an unfavourable stage for us, because our enemies
have more time before them than we have and can afford to wait
longer than we, unfortunately, are able to do. It cannot yet be
said what course events will take in Russia. I hope--and this is
the vital point of my whole argument--that Russia has lost her
motive power for a long time to come, perhaps for ever, and that
this important factor will be made use of. I expect, nevertheless,
that a Franco-English, probably also an Italian, offensive will be
launched at the first opportunity, though I hope and trust that we
shall be able to repulse