to Poland, which was about to be reorganised, and to make
efforts to ensure that this Great-Polish State should be attached to
Germany--not _incorporated_, but, say, some form of personal union.

The Emperor and I went to Kreuznach, where I first of all made the
proposal to Bethmann and Zimmermann, and subsequently, in the presence
of the Emperor Charles and Bethmann, laid it before the Emperor
William. It was not accepted unconditionally, nor yet refused, and the
conference terminated with a request from the Germans for
consideration of the question.

In making this proposal, I was fully aware of all that it involved. If
Germany accepted the offer, and we in our consequent negotiations with
the Entente did not secure any noteworthy alterations in the Pact of
London, we could count on war only. In that case, we should have to
satisfy not only Italy, Roumania, and Serbia, but would also lose the
hoped-for compensation in the annexation of Poland. The Emperor
Charles saw the situation very clearly, but resolved at once,
nevertheless, to take the proposed step.

I, however, thoroughly believed then--though wrongly--that in the
circumstances London and Paris would have been able to effect an
amendment in the Pact of London. It was not until much later that a
definite refusal of our offer was sent by Germany.

In April, before a decision had been arrived at, I sent a report to
the Emperor Charles explaining the situation to him, and requesting
that he would submit it to the Emperor William.

The report was as follows:--

Will Your Majesty permit me, with the frankness granted me from
the first day of my appointment, to submit to Your Majesty my
responsible opinion of the situation?

It is quite obvious that our military strength is coming to an
end. To enter into lengthy details in this connection would be to
take up Your Majesty's time needlessly.

I allude only to the decrease in raw materials for the production
of munitions, to the thoroughly exhausted human material, and,
above all, to the dull despair that pervades all classes owing to
under-nourishment and renders impossible any further endurance of
the sufferings from the war.

Though I trust we shall succeed in holding out during the next few
months and carry out a successful defence, I am nevertheless
quite convinced that another winter campaign would be absolutely
out of the question; in other words, that in the late summer