ved to calm the Allies.

It appears extremely doubtful to me, however, whether this advance
would have led to anything, had the occasion been more favourable. The
previously mentioned letter of the Imperial Chancellor Michaelis dates
from those August days, a letter referring to Belgian projects which
were very far removed from the English ideas on the subject. And even
if it had been possible to settle the Belgian question, there would
have been that of Alsace-Lorraine, which linked France and England
together, and, first and foremost, the question of disarmament. The
chasm that divided the two camps would have grown so wide that no
bridge could possibly have spanned it.

Not until January, 1918, did I learn the English version. According to
that, the Germans are said to have taken the first steps, and the
English were not disinclined to listen, but heard nothing further. It
was stated in _Vorwaerts_ that the suggestion was made at the
instigation of the Cabinet Council, but that subsequently military
influence gained the upper hand. The episode did not tend to improve
the frame of mind of the leading men in England.

In the early summer of 1917 conditions seemed favourable for peace and
the hope of arriving at an understanding, though still far distant,
was not exactly a Utopian dream. How far the hope of splitting our
group and the failure of the U-boat warfare may have contributed to
stiffen the desire for war in the Entente countries cannot definitely
be stated. Both factors had a share in it. Before we came to a
deadlock in the negotiations, the position was such that even in case
of a separate peace we should have been compelled to accept the terms
of the conference of London. Whether the Entente would have abandoned
that basis if we had not veered from the straight course, and by
unofficial cross-purposes become caught in the toils of separatist
desires, but had quickly and consistently carried out our task, is not
proved, and never will be. After the debacle in the winter of 1918-19
it was intimated to me as a fact that when Clemenceau came into power
a peace of understanding with Germany became out of the question. His
standpoint was that Germany must be definitely vanquished and crushed.
Our negotiations, however, had begun under Briand, and Clemenceau only
came into power when the peace negotiations had become entangled and
were beginning to falter.

With regard to Austria-Hungary, both France and Englan