ccession. First came our
terrible defeat in Italy, then the Entente break-through on the
Western front, and finally the Bulgarian secession, which had
gradually been approaching since the summer of 1917.

3

As is the case in all countries, among the Entente during the war
there were many and varied currents of thought. When Clemenceau came
into office the definite destruction of Germany was the dominant war
aim.

To those who neither see nor hear the secret information which a
Foreign Minister naturally has at his disposal, it may appear as
though the Entente, in the question of crushing Germany's military
strength, had sometimes been ready to make concessions. I think that
this may have been the case in the spring of 1917, but not later, when
any such hope was deceptive. Lansdowne in particular spoke and wrote
in a somewhat friendly tone, but Lloyd George was the determining
influence in England.

When sounding England on different occasions, I endeavoured to
discover by what means the dissolution of the military power in
Germany was to be or could be guaranteed--and I invariably came to an
_impasse_. It was never explained how England intended to carry out
the proposal.

The truth is that there is no way of disarming a strong and determined
people except by defeating them, but such an aim was not to be openly
admitted to us in the preliminary dealings. The delegates could not
suggest any suitable mode of discussion, and no other proposals could
lead to a decision.

Lansdowne, and perhaps Asquith as well, would have been content with a
parliamentary regime which would have deprived the Emperor of power
and given it to the Reichstag. Not so Lloyd George; at least, not
later. The English Prime Minister's well-known speech, "A disarmament
treaty with Germany would be a treaty between a fox and many geese,"
conveyed what he really thought.

After my Budapest speech, which was treated with such scorn and
contempt in the Press and by public opinion on the other side of the
Channel, word was sent to me from an English source that it was said
the "Czernin scheme" might settle the question. But again it was not
Lloyd George who said that.

Owing to the extreme distrust that Clemenceau, the English Prime
Minister, and with them the great majority in France and England, had
of Germany's intentions, no measure could be devised that would have
given London and Paris a sufficient guarantee for a future peaceful
polic